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SOCIAL HOST LIABILITY FOR INJURIES CAUSED BY
THE ACTS OF AN INTOXICATED GUEST

I. INTRODUCTION
Alcohol consumption at social gatherings has become a way of
life in our society. At the same time, the automobile has become
society's most popular mode of transportation. 1 In 1981
approximately 52,600 motor vehicle accidents occurred in the
United States. 2 Typically, alcohol was involved in less than ten
percent of minor traffic accidents, in twenty percent of accidents
involving serious injury to a driver or passenger, in fifty percent of
all fatal accidents, and in sixty percent of all fatal single vehicle
3
accidents.
In many instances, it is the sober driver or passenger that is
killed or injured in an alcohol related motor vehicle collision. These
innocent third parties or their estates often seek compensation for
injuries or death from the intoxicated driver or his estate in
negligence or wrongful death actions. Frequently, however, the
person or his estate is insolvent. Therefore, the plaintiffs seek
recovery from the individual furnishing or selling the alcohol that
1. DeMoulin & Whitcomb, Social Host's Liability in FurnishingAlcoholicBeverages, 27 FED'N OF INS.
CouNs. Q. 349 (1977). In 1980 approximately 123.5 million cars were in operation in the United
States. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 612 (102d
ed. 1981). In 1980 the consuming public expended 43.7 billion dollars on alcoholic beverages; in
1981, 46.2 billion dollars were spent. A & W PUBLISHERS, INFORMATION PLEASE ALMANAC 55 (37th
ed. 1983).

2.

NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, ACCIDENT FACTS 52

(1981).

3. H. Ross, DETERRING THE DRINKING DRIVER XiV (1982).
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caused the other party's intoxication.
At common law the furnishing or sale of intoxicating liquors to
an able-bodied person was not a tort. 4 Courts frequently held that
in the absence of a statute no cause of action existed in favor of one
injured by an intoxicated person against the person furnishing such
alcohol. 5 The rationale for this rule was that the consumption of
alcohol, rather than the furnishing of it, was the proximate cause of
the injury. 6 Courts based this rationale on the fact that one cannot
become intoxicated by liquor furnished to him unless he consumes
it. I
Courts have described the common law rule that immunizes
individuals furnishing liquor from civil liability as a "back-eddy
running counter to the mainstream of modern tort doctrine.",,
Courts have utilized three legal theories to abrogate this common
law rule and impose liability for injuries caused by an intoxicated
person upon one furnishing the liquor. 9 First, some states have
adopted statutes known as "dram shop acts." 10 These statutes
generally confer a right of action on persons injured in person,
property, or means of support caused by the intoxication of any
person against the person selling or furnishing the liquor. 11
4. Alsup v. Garvin-Wienke, Inc., 579 F.2d 461 (8th Cir. 1978); Megge v. United States, 344
F.2d 31 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 831 (1965); Chastain v. Litton Systems, Inc., 527 F. Supp.
527 (W.D.N.C. 1981). The court in State ex rel. Joyce v. Hatfield, 197 Md. 249, 78 A.2d 754
(1951), stated:
Apart from statute, the common law knows no right of action against a seller of
intoxicating liquors, as such, for "causing" intoxication of the person whose negligent
or wilful wrong has caused injury. Human beings, drunk or sober, are responsible for
their own torts. The law (apart from statute) recognizes no relation of proximate cause
between a sale of liquor and a tort committed by a buyer who has drunk the liquor.
Id. at __,
78 A.2d at 756.
5. E.g., Alsup v. Garvin-Wienke, Inc., 579 F.2d 461, 464 (8th Cir. 1978); Megge v. United
States, 344 F.2d 31, 32 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 831 (1965). See generally 45 AM. JUR. 2D
IntoxicatingLiquors § 553 (1969).
6. DeLoach v. Mayer Elec. Supply Co., 378 So. 2d 733 (Ala. 1979); Trail v. Christian, 298
Minn. 101, 213 N.W.2d 618 (1973); Griffin v. Sebak, 90 S.D. 692, 245 N.W.2d 481 (1976); Garcia
v. Hargrove, 46 Wis. 2d 724, 176 N.W.2d 566 (1970).
7. E.g., Nolan v. Morelli, 154 Conn. 432,
-, 226 A.2d 383, 386 (1967). See generally 45 AM.
JUR. 2o IntoxicatingLiquors 5 553 (1969).
8. Brockett v. Kitchen Boyd Motor Co., 24 Cal. App. 3d 87, 89, 100 Cal. Rptr. 752, 753 (Ct.
App. 1972); Fuller v. Standard Stations, Inc., 250 Cal. App. 2d 687, 691, 58 Cal. Rptr. 792, 794
(Ct. App. 1967).
9. See Note, Liability of Liquor Vendors to Third Party Victims, 56 NEB. L. REv. 951 (1977); Note,
Extension of the Dram Shop Act: New Found Liabilityof the Social Host, 49 N.D.L. REv. 67, 68-71 (1972).
10. Fourteen states currently have dram shop acts in effect. 'See ALA. CODE § 6-5-71 (1977);
COLO. Ray. STAT. § 13-21-103 (1974); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 5 30-102 (West 1975); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 43, § 135 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982); IowA CODE ANN. 5 123.92 (West Supp. 1982); ME.
REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, 5 2002 (1983); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 436.22 (Supp. 1982); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 340.95 (West Supp. 1982); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 11-101 (McKinney 1978 & Supp.
1982); N.D. CENT. CODE § 5-01-06 (1975); OHIO Rav. CODE ANN. § 4399.01 (Page 1982); R.I. GEN.
LAws § 3-11-1 (1976); UTAH CODE ANN. § 32-11-1 (Supp. 1981); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 501 (1972).
11. Roberts v. Casey, 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 89, 225 A.2d 836 (Cir. Ct. 1966); Hartwig v. Loyal
Order of Moose, 253 Minn. 347, 91 N.W.2d 794 (1958); Iszler v. Jorda, 80 N.W.2d 665 (N.D.
1957).
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The second theory applied by courts is the alcoholic beverage
control act. 12 These statutes regulate the sale and furnishing of
alcohol to the public.1 3 Particularly, they prohibit the sale of
alcohol to particular individuals who pose a high risk of danger to
the public.14 Typically, these statutes forbid the sale of furnishing
16
of alcohol to a minor 5 or an obviously intoxicated person.
Finally, the courts have applied common law negligence
principles to impose liability upon a social host.' 7 Under this theory
the courts impose a duty on the social host once the plaintiff
establishes that it was foreseeable that the intoxicated person would
operate a motor vehicle, thus endangering other drivers. 18 A breach
of this duty occurs when the host fails to exercise reasonable care by
serving the already intoxicated guest more alcohol or by allowing
the guest to drive in an intoxicated condition. 19
This Note will examine the civil liability of a social host to a
third party who is injured by the negligent act of a guest. This
12. All states and the District of Columbia have adopted alcoholic beverage control acts. See
ALA. CODE§ 28-7-21 (Supp. 1982); ALASKA STAT. §§ 04.16.030, .051 (1962); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN.
§§ 4-241, -244 (1974); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 48-529 (1977); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE ANN. §§ 25602,
25658 (West 1964 & Supp. 1982); COLO. REv. STAT. § 12-47-128 (Supp. 1982); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 30-86 (West 1975); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 4, § 713 (1975 & Supp. 1982); D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 25-121 (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. 55562.11, .50 (West Supp. 1983); GA. CODE ANN. § 5A-9901.1
(Supp. 1982); HAWAII REV. STAT. 5 281-78 (1976); IDAHO CODE §§ 23-312, -929 (1977); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 43, § 131 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 7.1-5-7-8, -5-10-14, -5-10-15
(Burns Supp. 1982); IowA CODE ANN. § 123.49 (West Supp. 1982); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 41-2615
(1981); Ky. REV. STAT. § 244.080 (1981); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:91 (West 1974); id. § 26:88(1)
(West 1975); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, §5 303, 1058 (Supp. 1982); MD. ANN. CODE art. 2B, §
118 (Supp. 1979); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 138, §§ 34, 69 (West 1974 & Supp. 1982); MICH.
ANN.
LAws
ANN.
§§ 436.29,
.33
(1978 &
Supp.
1982); MINN.
STAT.
COMP.
§ 340.73 (West 1972 & Supp. 1982); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 67-1-81, -83 (Supp. 1982); Mo. ANN.
Stat. § 311-310 (Vernon Supp. 1983); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-624 (1981); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 53-180 (1978); NEV. REV. STAT. § 202.055 (1981); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 175:6 (Supp. 1981);
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 33:1-39, -77 (West Supp. 1981); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-7A-16, -7B-1 (Supp.
1981); N.Y. ALCO. BEy. CONT. LAW § 65 (McKinney 1970 & Supp. 1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B-,
305 (Supp. 1981); N.D. CENT. CODE § 5-01-09 (1975); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4301.22, 69 (Page
1982); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 37, § 537 (West Supp. 1982); OR. REV. STAT. 5 471.410 (1981);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 4-493 (Purdon 1969 & Supp. 1982); R.I. GEN. LAWS 553-8-1, -6 (Supp.
1982); S.C. CODE ANN. 5 61-3-990 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1982); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 35-4-78
(1977); TENN. CODE ANN. § 57-4-203 (Supp. 1982); TEX. ALCO. BEV. CODE ANN. tit. 4, §§ 101.63,
106.03 (Vernon 1978 & Supp. 1982); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 32-7-14, -15 (1974); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
7. § 658 (Supp. 1982); VA. CODE § 4-62 (Supp. 1982): WASH. REV. CODE 5§ 66.44.200..270 (1962);
W. VA. CODE § 60-3-22 (1977); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 125.07 (West Supp 1982); WYo. STAT. § 12-6-

101 (1981).

13. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 5436.29, .33 (1978 & Supp. 1982); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
340.73 (West 1972); N.D. CENT. CODE § 5-01-09 (1975).
14. Graham, Liability of the Social Hostfor Injuries Caused by the Negligent Acts of Intoxicated Guests, 16
WIL.AMETTE L.J. 561, 569-70 (1980).
15. E.g.. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25658 (West 1964). Section 25658 provides that "[e]very
person who sells, furnishes, gives, or causes to be sold, furnished, or given away, any alcoholic
beverage to any person under the age of2l years is guilty of a misdemeanor." Id.
16. E.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 125.07(2) (West Supp. 1982). Section 125.07(2) provides that "[n]o
person may procure for, sell, dispense or give away alcohol beverages to a person who is
intoxicated." Id.
17. E.g., Weiner v. Gamma Phi Chapter of Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, 258 Or. 632, 485
P.2d 18 (1971).
18. Comment, Employer Liability.fora Drunken Employee's Actions Followingan Office Party: A Cause of
Action UnderRespondeat Superior, 19 CAL. W.L. RE-,. 107. 116 n.56 (1982).
19. Id.
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liability will be examined based on the dram shop acts, 20 the
alcoholic beverage control acts as they exist in the various states,
and on common law negligence principles.
II. DRAM SHOP ACTS
A.

HISTORY OF DRAM SHOP ACTS

The early common law limited recovery for injuries caused by
an intoxicated person to the individual drinker; no recovery was
allowed against the liquor seller. 2 1 The temperance reform
movement's early efforts were also aimed at the individual
drinker. 22 In the 1830s, however, the prohibitionists gave up hope
that the individual drinker would reform himself and turned to the
23
state legislatures in an attempt to cut off the supply of liquor.
Consequently, some courts consider the dram shop acts to be a
product of the prohibition movement. 24 The National Temperance
Movement's 25 efforts were fully realized with the ratification of the
eighteenth amendment to the Constitution in 1919.26 Prior to that
time, however, prohibitionists lobbied state legislatures to enact
dram shop acts to control liquor traffic and to provide "against the
20. Dram shop acts are also known as civil damage, acts.
21. Cole v. Rush, 45 Cal. 2d 345, 289 P.2d 450 (1955). See generally Annot., 54 A.L.R. 2D 1137
(1957).
22. McGough, DramShopActs, A.B.A. SEC. oF INS. NEGL. & COMPENSATION L. 448 (1967).
23. Id. In 1832 the Massachusetts Legislature attempted to legislate temperance. Id. The statute
limited the sale of liquor to 30 gallons or more. Id. The legislature sought to close down shops that
sold liquor by the drink. Id. In 1838 the Massachusetts Legislature reduced the minimum amount for
sale to 15 gallons. Id. When opponents of the statute contended that the law would reduce the poor
man's liquor supply, the proponents claimed that most citizens could afford the $5 or $6 cost of 15
gallons. Id. In the same year, the Maine Legislature failed to pass a "28 gallon law" by one vote. Id.
In 1939 Mississippi adopted a "1 gallon law." Id.
24. Sharp, Dram Shop Laws and Problems, 28 ALA. LAW. 409 (1967). In Cunningham v. Brown,
174 N.E.2d 153 (Ill.
1961), the court discussed the temperance movement and its effect on the
promulgation of dram shop acts as follows:
The new social consciousness which was influencing education and religion in the 118]
70s found in the temperance movement a concrete issue upon which it could lavish its
energy .... The definite goal at which the temperance forces were aiming was the
enactment of a law which would adequately express their attitude toward the liquor
traffic, and which would provide against the evils resulting from the sale of
intoxicating liquors . . . . Before opposition forces fully realized how strong the
temperance wave had become, however, their agitation, meetings, pleas and
persuasion culminated in the passage of the temperance bill of 1872.
Id. at 155 (citing FOUR, BOGART & THOMPSON, A CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF ILLINOIS 42-44 (1920)).
25. For a discussion ofthe temperance movement, see 21 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITTANICA 821 (1970).
26. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII (1919) (repealed 1933). The text of the 18th amendment
provided:
Section 1. After one year from the ratification of this article the manufacture,
sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the importation thereof into, or
the exportation thereof from the United States and all territory subject to the
jurisdiction thereof for beverage purposes is hereby prohibited.
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evils . . . of intoxicating liquor. ' 27 The result of these lobbying
efforts was the enactment of statutes imposing civil liability on
28
innkeepers for damages resulting from the illegal sale of liquor.
In 1850 Wisconsin adopted the first statute 29 imposing civil
liability for damages on innkeepers for harm arising from the sale
of intoxicating liquors. 30 The Wisconsin statute, however, merely
31
required innkeepers to post a bond as a condition of licensure.
Present day dram shop acts more closely resemble a statute enacted
in Indiana in 1853.32 The 1853 Indiana statute provided:
Any wife, child, parent, guardian, employer or other
person, who shall be injured in person or property, or
means of support, by any intoxicated person or in
consequence of the intoxication, habitual or otherwise, of
any person, shall have right of action in his or her own
name, against any person and his sureties on the bond
aforesaid, who shall by retailing spiritous liquor, have
caused the intoxication of such person for all damages
33
sustained and for exemplary damages.
3
The Indiana Dram Shop Act was repealed five years later. 4
Similar statutes, however, were adopted by Ohio in 1854, 35 New
York in 1857,36 Pennsylvania in 1854, 37 and Maine in 1858.38
Section 2. The Congress and the several States shall have concurrent power to
enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
Section 3. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an
amendment to the Constitution by the Legislatures of the several States, as provided
in the Constitution, within seven years from the date of the submission hereof to the
States by the Congress.
Id.
27. Sharp, supra note 24, at 409 (citing Ogilvie, History and Appraisal of Illinois Dram Shop Act,
1958 U. ILL. L.J. 175).

28. Note, Extension of the Dram Shop Act: New FoundLiability of te Social Host, 49 N.D.L. REv. 67,
69(1972).
29. Act ofFeb. 8, 1850, ch. 139, § 1, 1850 Wis. Laws 109.
30. McGough, supra note 22, at 449. Under the Wisconsin statute an innkeeper was required to
post a bond conditioned on an agreement that he "support all paupers, widows and orphans, and
pay the expenses of all civil and criminal prosecutions growing out of or justly attributable to such
[liquor] traffic." Id. The statute also provided a married woman the right to sue for injuries to her
husband. Id.
31. Id.
32. Act of March 4, 1853, ch. 66, 5 10, 1853 Ind. Acts 88.
33. Id. The dram shop owner was required to file a bond of $500 to $2000 based on the number
oftownship inhabitants who could possibly file claims arising from the sale ofliquor. Id. 5 1, at 87.
34. Act of Dec. 21, 1858, ch. 15, 1858 Ind. Acts 40.
35. State ex rel. Joyce v. Hatfield, 197 Md. 249, -,
78 A.2d 754, 756 (1951) (citing Mulford
v. Clewell, 21 Ohio St. 191 (1871)).
36. Hafield, 197 Md. at -, 78 A.2d at 756 (citing Bertholf v. O'Reilly, 74 N.Y. 509, 518
(1857)).
37. McGough, supra note 22, at 449.
38. Hatfield, 197 Md. at -_, 78 A.2d at 756 (citing Currier v. McKee, 99 Me. 364, 366, 59 A.
442, 444-45 (1904)).
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During the 1870s numerous state legislatures, pressured by
temperance groups, adopted dram shop acts. 3 9 Many of these acts
remained in the statute books until the passage of prohibition in
1919.40

The dram shop acts that still exist 41 vary in form from state to
state. Several states require that for a cause of action to arise, the
sale or furnishing must be contrary to a state statute.4 2 Twelve
states 43 have "broad form" dram shop acts. 44 These acts provide a
cause of action for the following two types of damages resulting
from intoxication: injury to means of support45 and injury to
person or property.4 6 Two states, Rhode Island and Connecticut,
provide a similar remedy for injury to person or property, but have
no specific statutory remedy for loss of support. 47 Furthermore,
Connecticut4a and Illinois49 limit the amount of recovery available
under the statute. Alabama,5 0 Maine, 5 1 and New York 52 specifically provide for the award of exemplary as well as actual damages.
Generally, if a plaintiff has suffered an injury to his means of
support or damage to his person or property, he must prove five
elements to recover under a dram shop act. 53 First, he must show a
39. McGough, supra note 22, at 449-50.
40. Id. Prohibition is the legal prevention of the sale, manufacture, or transportation of alcoholic
beverages. 18 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 609 (1970). Nationwide prohibition was adopted in the
United States with the adoption of the 18th amendment to the United States Constitution in 1919.
U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII. However, the amendment was repealed in 1933 with the adoption of
the 21st amendment to the United States Constitution. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
41. For a list of current dram shop acts, see supra note 10.
42. See ALA. CODE 5 6-5-71 (1975); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2002 (1983); MIcH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 436.22 (1978 & Supp. 1982-1983); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 340.95 (1972); N.Y. GEN.
OBLIG. LAWS § 11-101 (McKinney 1970); N.D. CENT. CODE § 5-01-06 (1975); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 311-1 (1976); UTAH CODE ANN. § 32-11-1 (Page 1982); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, §501 (1972).
43. See ALA. CODE § 6-5-71 (1975); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-103 (1974); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
43, § 135 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982); IowA CODE ANN. § 123.92 (West Supp. 1982); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 17, § 2002 (1983); MtCH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 436.22 (Supp. 1982); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
340.95 (West Supp. 1982); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 11-101 (McKinney 1978 & Supp. 1982); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 5-01-06 (1975); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4399.01 (Page 1982); UTAH CODE ANN. § 3211-1 (Supp. 1981); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 501 (1972).
44. McGough, supra note 22, at 450.
45. See generally Annot., 4 A.L.R.3D 1332 (1965) (dram shop act definition of injury to means of
support).
46. See generally 6 A.L.R.2D 798 (1949) (dram shop act definition of injury to person or
property).
47. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 30-102 (West 1975); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 3-11-1 (1976).
48. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 30-102 (West 1975). Section 30-102 provides that "such seller
shall pay just damages ... up to the amount of twenty thousand dollars, or to persons injured.., up
to an aggregate amount of fifty thousand dollars. Id.
49. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 43, § 135 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982). Section 135 provides that "[i]n
no event shall the judgment or recovery under this Act for injury to the person or to the property of
any person.., exceed $15,000, and recovery under this Act for loss of means ofsupport.., shall not
exceed... $20,000 for each person so injured ." Id.
50. See ALA. CODE § 6-5-71 (1975).
51. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2002 (1983).
52. See N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 11-101 (McKinney 1978).
53. MeGough, supra note 22, at 453-54.
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conveyance, either by sale5 4 or gift 55 of an intoxicating liquor.5 6
Second, the plaintiff must show a statutory violation in the
supplying of liquor. A violation may be in the form of a sale or
5 8
5 7
furnishing to a visibly intoxicated person, a habitual drunkard,
5 9
or a minor. Illinois, however, does not require proof of this
element. 60 Third, the plaintiff must show that the intoxicated
person consumed liquor. 6 1 Fourth, the liquor sold or furnished to
62
this intoxicated person must have contributed to his intoxication.
Finally, although the intoxication need not be the proximate cause,
the plaintiff must prove some nexus between the intoxication and
the injury. 63 Once proof of these elements is established, a plaintiff
may recover damages under a dram shop act.
B.

CASE LAW: DRAM SHOP ACTS AND SOCIAL HOSTS

The well-accepted principle discussed above states that
damages may be recovered from dram shop owners or sellers of
intoxicating liquors. 64 Generally, an action for damages is available
to either the intoxicated person 65 or a third party injured by the
intoxicated person. 66 The issue whether a social host is liable for
damages, however, varies among the jurisdications that have dram
54. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 5 30-102 (West 1975). Section 30-102 is the only dram shop
statute specifically limited to the seller ofintoxicating liquors.
55. See ALA. CODE § 6-5-71 (1975) (selling, giving, or otherwise disposing); COLO. REv. STAT.
513-21-103 (1973) (selling or giving away); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 43, § 135 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982)
(selling or giving); IOWA CODE ANN. § 123.92 (West Supp. 1982) (sell or give); ME. REv. STAT. ANN.
tit. 17, § 2002 (1983) (selling or giving); MICH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. 5 436.22 (Supp. 1982) (selling,
giving, or furnishing); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 340.95 (West Supp. 1983) (selling or bartering); N.Y.
GEN. OBLiG. LAW § 11-101 (McKinney 1978) (selling or assisting in procuring); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 5-01-06 (1975) (disposing, selling, bartering, or giving away); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. 5 4399.01
(Page 1982) (selling or giving); R.I. GEN. LAws § 3-11-1 (1976) (furnishing); UTAH CODE ANN. § 3211-1 (Supp. 1981) (gives, sells, or otherwise provides); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 501 (1972) (selling or
furnishing).
56. Annot., 52 A.L.R.2o 890 (1957) (dram shop act definition of intoxicating liquor).
57. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 30-102 (West 1975); IOWA CODE ANN. § 123.92 (West Supp.
1982); MICH. COMp. LAws ANN. § 436.22 (Supp. 1982); UTAH CODE ANN. § 32-11-1 (Supp. 1981).
58. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-103 (1973); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4399.01 (Page 1982).
59. Trapp v. 4-10 Inv. Corp., 424 F.2d 1261 (8th Cir. 1970); Fladeland v. Mayer, 102 N.W.2d
121 (N.D. 1960).
60. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 43, 5 135 (West 1982). Section 135 does not require a statutory
violation in the sale or giving of intoxicating liquor for liability to exist under the dram shop act. The
selling or giving of intoxicating liquor need only "cause the intoxication." Id.
61. McGough, supra note 22, at 453.
62. Henry v. Bloomington Third Ward Community Club, 89 111. App. 3d 106, 411 N.E.2d 540
(App. Ct. 1980); Walton v. Stokes, 270 N.W.2d 627 (Iowa 1978); Archer v. Burton, 91 Mich. App.
57, 282 N.W.2d 833 (Ct. app. 1979). See generallyAnnot., 64 A.L.R.3o 882, 890-97 (1975).
63. Annot., 64 A.L.R.3D 882 (1975) (proof of causation of intoxication as a prerequisite to
recovery under dram shop act).
64. E.g., Trapp v. 4-10 Inv. Corp., 424 F.2d 1261 (8th Cir. 1970); Manning v. Andy, 454 Pa.
237, 310 A.2d 75 (1973).
65. Annot., 65 A.L.R.2D 923 (1959) (liability of liquor furnisher under dram shop act for injury
or death to intoxicated person).
66. Note, Liability of Tavern-Keeper to Third Person Injuredby Oneto Whom Tavern-KeeperHadMade an
UnlawfulSale of Liquor, 58 MICH. L. REV. 1075 (1960).
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shop acts. Most courts limit liability under dram shop acts to those
67
individuals in the business of selling liquor.
Some courts hold that dram shop acts were not intended to
create a right of action against one who, without pecuniary gain,
provides liquor as a gratuitous act of hospitality. 68 The courts'
rationale for limiting dram shop liability to those in the business of
selling liquor is apparently based on one or all of the following
concepts: (1) because the purpose of a dram shop act is to suppress
illegal liquor sales rather than to extend a remedy to injured
parties, courts must strictly construe the statute; (2) courts must
base any judicial extension of the dram shop act remedy on the
historical facts that motivated the passage of the act; (3) to avoid
opening the "floodgates" of litigation, courts should defer any
69
extension of the remedy to the legislature.
The leading case in the area of social host liability is Cruse v.
Aden. 70 In Cruse the plaintiff widow contended that the defendant
was liable to her under the Illinois Dram Shop Act for means of
support. 7 1 The plaintiff alleged that Mr. Cruse, the decedent,
received two drinks at the home of the defendant, that he became
intoxicated, and that he died when thrown from his horse on the
way home. 7 2 The complaint alleged that the decedent's intoxication
caused the accident. 73 The Illinois Supreme Court denied recovery
to the widow. 74 The court noted that the title of the act indicated
that the statutory provisions were directed at dram shops and those
individuals "engaged, either lawfully or unlawfully, directly or
indirectly, in liquor traffic." ' 75 The court held that the Illinois
Dram Shop Act did not apply to persons who are not significantly
engaged in liquor traffic. 76 The court stated:
[T]he right of action given by said [statute] . . . to one
67. See Miller v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 48 Ill.
App. 2d 412,199 N.E.2d 300 (App. Ct. 1964);
Gabrielle v.Craft, 75 A.D.2d 939, 428 N.Y.S.2d 84 (App. Div. 1980): Edgar v. Kajet, 55 A.D.2d
597, 389 N.Y.S.2d 631 (App. Div. 1976).
68. See, e.g., DeLoach v. Mayer Elec. Supply Co., 378 So. 2d 733 (Ala. 1979); Manning v.
Andy, 454 Pa. 2d 237, 310 A.2d 75 (1973).
69. Note, Extension of the Dram Shop Act: New FoundLiability qfthe Social Host, 49 N.D.L. REv. 67,
72(1972).
70. 127 Ill. 231, 20 N.E. 73 (1889).
71. Cruse v. Aden, 127 Ill. 231,
-., 20 N.E. 73. 74 (1889). Julia Ann Cruse alleged in her
complaint that her husband had worked all his life and had supported her from his work as a farmer
up until the time of his death. Id. Her complaint further alleged that the defendant's intoxication was
the proximate cause of the accident that resulted in her husband's death. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. The plaintiffdid not allege that the defendant was engaged either directly or indirectly in
the sale or traffic of intoxicating liquors. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at _.
20 N.E. at 75.
76. Id. at -__
,20 N.E. at 77.
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injured in her means of support is not intended to be
given against a person who, in his house or elsewhere,
gives a glass of intoxicating liquor to a friend as a mere act
of courtesy and politeness, and without any purpose or
expectation of pecuniary gain or profit.77
Another court denied social host liability in Miller v. OwensIllinois Glass Co. 78 In Miller the plaintiffs sued an employer, an
employees' association, and certain individual employees under the
Illinois Dram Shop Act for injuries received when an intoxicated
employee's car collided with plaintiffs' car. 79 The plaintiffs alleged

that the defendant employee became intoxicated at a company
picnic and that the defendant employee's intoxication caused the
accident. 8 0 The Illinois Appellate Court, upholding the trial court's
summary judgment for the defendants, held:
This court does not believe that the legislature ever
intended to enact a law that makes social drinking of
intoxicating liquors and the giving of drinks of
intoxicating liquors to another, such conduct as to render
the giver or host liable under the Dram Shop Act. If such
was the law, a social drink with your neighbor or friend
would become a hazardous act. It would open up the
floodgates of litigation as to almost every happening
where someone was injured. 81
The court indicated that the Illinois Dram Shop Act was
remedial in purpose but penal in nature. 82 The penal nature of the
statute required that it be strictly construed. 83 The court noted that
because of the penal character of the statute, "courts should
faithfully seek to apply the remedy provided for in the Dram Shop
Act in order to serve its purpose in mitigating the evils . . .which
77. Id.
78.48 11. App. 2d 412, 199 N.E.2d 300 (App. Ct. 1964).
79. Miller v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 48 Ill.
App. 2d 412, 413, 199 N.E.2d 300, 301 (App. Ct.

1964).
80. Id. The Madison Onized Association consisted of members who were employed by Owens-

Illinois Glass Company. The purposes of the Association were to promote social activities and to
improve the general welfare and employer-employee relationships of its members. Id. On September
9, 1961, the Association held a picnic for the benefit of its members at which alcoholic beverages were
served. Id.
81. Id. at 423, 199 N.E.2d at 306.
82. Id. at 420, 199 N.E.2d at 305 (citing Howlett v. Doglio, 402 11. 311, 83 N.E.2d 708 (1949);
Butler v. Wittland, 18 Ill.
App. 2d 578, 153 N.E.2d 106 (App. Ct. 1958); Lichter v. Scher, 1111.
App. 2d 441, 138 N.E.2d 66 (App. Ct. 1956); Robertson v. White, 11 Il.App. 2d 177, 136 N.E.2d
550 (App. Ct. 1956)).
83. 48 111. App. 2d at 422, 199 N.E.2d at 306.
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flow from liquor traffic, yet they cannot enlarge the scope of the act
beyond a reasonable interpretation of its language. "84 The court
held that a strict construction of the Illinois Dram Shop Act limited
its application to those persons in the business of selling liquor.85
extension of the Act to the
Thus, the court left any possible
86
legislature.
state
the
of
discretion
In Kohler v. Wray87 the court held that no social host liability
existed under the New York Dram Shop Act even though the hosts
had asked the guests to help pay for the alcohol. 88 In Kohler the
plaintiff was struck by a fellow guest when he asked the latter's wife
to dance; the blow broke the plaintiffs jaw. 89 The plaintiff sued the
social hosts for damages under the New York Dram Shop Act. 90
The statute allows recovery for injuries caused by an intoxicated
person from "any person" who unlawfully contributes to his
intoxication. 91 The court noted that liability under the statute did
92
not flow from mere service of alcohol to an intoxicated person.
Rather, the statute required that a prohibited sale of alcoholic
beverages take place. 93 The court found that no such sale had been
84. Id. at 421-22, 199 N.E.2d at 305 (citing Robertson v. White, 11 111. App. 2d 177, 136
N.E.2d 550 (App. Ct. 1956)).
85. 48 Ill. App. 2d at 423, 199 N.E.2d at 306. The court interpreted the word "giving" in the"
dram shop act to apply only to those individuals in the business of selling liquor. Id. The court
refused to designate any of the defendants as sellers of intoxicating liquor. Id. The court dismissed
the plaintiff's contention that the defendants had a pecuniary interest in the picnic simply because
the Association was financed by proceeds from vending machines placed in the employers' plant,
cash gifts awarded the employees for efficiency, and by the sale of glassware manufactured by a
subsidiary of the glass company. Id. at 417, 199 N.E.2d at 303.
86. Id. at 422-23, 199 N.E.2d at 306. See also Gabrielle v. Craft, 75 A.D.2d 939, 428 N.Y.S.2d
84 (App. Div. 1980) (court refuses to judicially extend the dram shop act to social hosts); Edgar v.
Kajet, 84 Misc. 2d 100, 375 N.Y.S.2d 548 (Sup. Ct. 1975) (court defers to legislature the extension
of the dram shop act to social hosts), aff'd, 55 A.D.2d 597, 389 N.Y.S.2d 631 (App. Div. 1976).
87. 114 Misc. 2d 856, 452 N.Y.S.2d 831 (Sup. Ct. 1982).
88. Kohler v. Wray, 114 Misc. 2d 856,-._, 452 N.Y.S.2d 831, 835 (Sup. Ct. 1982).
452 N.Y.S.2d at 833. The evidence showed that on February 21, 1981, the
89. Id. at -,
defendants invited several friends into their home for a housewarming party, which featured a band
and several kegs of beer. Id. at-., 452 N.Y.S.2d at 832. When the plaintiff arrived, the defendants
told him to help himself to the beer. Id. Plaintiff claimed that at this time he was asked to contribute
some money toward the purchase of more beer. Id. A short time later he asked a woman to dance
452 N.Y.S.2d at 833. An
who, unbeknown to the plaintiff, was married to a fellow guest. Id. at-.,
altercation ensued and the plaintiff'sjaw was broken during the fight. Id.
90. N.Y. GEN. OBLto. LAw 5 11-101 (McKinney 1978).
452 N.Y.S.2d at 833.
91. 114 Misc. 2d at.,
92. Id.
93. Id. "Prohibited sale" is defined in § 65 of the New York Alcoholic Beverage Control Act as
follows:
No person shall sell, deliver or give away or cause or permit or procure to be sold,
delivered or given away any alcoholic beverages to
1. Any person, actually or apparently, under the age of nineteen years;
2. Any intoxicated person or to any person, actually or apparently, under the
influence of liquor;
3. Any habitual drunkard known to be such to the person authorized to dispense
any alcoholic beverages.
N.Y. ALC. BEV. CONT. LAW § 65 (McKinney 1970 & Supp. 1982).
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94
shown or alleged by the plaintiff.
The plaintiff, attempting to distinguish prior case law holding
that the statute had no application to social hosts in a
noncommercial setting, 95 suggested that the defendants were not
social hosts because they requested their guests to help pay for the
beer. 96 The court dismissed the plaintiffs claim based on the
particular circumstances of the case. 97 The court found that the
hosts' conduct, unaccompanied by an expectation of pecuniary
gain, fell far short of the commercial activity the statute was
intended to prohibit. 98
These cases illustrate the general rule that no civil liability
extends to social hosts under dram shop acts. 99 Conversely,
Minnesota' 0 0 and Iowa' 01 courts have extended social host liability
under dram shop acts in the past. The continued viability of these
decisions, however, is questionable because both the Minnesota
and Iowa legislatures subsequently amended their dram shop
acts. 10 2 Yet, a discussion of these cases is useful for those states
whose courts have not addressed the issue of social host liability
under a dram shop act.
In Williams v. Klemsrud'03 the Iowa Supreme Court extended
liability under the dram shop act to those individuals not in the
business of selling liquor. 10 4 In Williams a twenty-one-year-old
college student agreed to purchase a pint of vodka for a minor
friend.10 5 The minor became intoxicated by consuming the alcohol
94. 114 Misc. 2d at - ,452 N.Y.S.2d at 833.
95. Id. The New York Dram Shop Act incorporated § 65 of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act.
For the text of § 65, see supra note 93. The Kohler court stated that "[although the words 'give away'
are included [in the statute] . .. [t]he statutes's title [Prohibited Sales] and its terms manifest the
obvious intent to exclude from its coverage the social host who gratuitously provides his guest with an
alcoholic beverage." 114 Misc. 2d at -,
452 N.Y.S.2d at 833 (citing Gabrielle v. Craft, 75
A.D.2d 938, 428 N.Y.S.2d 84 (App. Div. 1980)).
96. 114 Misc. 2d at -. , 452 N.Y.S.2d at 833 (relying on Miller v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co.,
48 Ill. App. 2d 412, 199 N.E.2d 300 (App. Ct. 1964); Edgar v. Kajet, 84 Misc. 2d 100, 375
N.Y.S.2d 548 (Sup. Ct. 1975), aff'd, 55 A.D.2d 597, 389 N.Y.S.2d 631 (App. Div. 1976)).
97. 114 Misc. 2d at -,452 N.Y.S.2d at 833.
98. Id.
99. See DeLoach v. Mayer Elec. Supply Co., 378 So. 2d 733 (Ala. 1979) (lack of sale is fatal to
action under dram shop act); Miller v. Moran, 96 Ill. App. 3d 596, 421 N.E.2d 1046 (App. Ct.
1981) (no civil liability of social host under dram shop act); Guitar v. Bieniek, 66 Mich. App. 82, 238
N.W.2d 205 (Ct. App. 1976) (dram shop act applies only to illegal transactions and only to those
who furnish liquor for financial remuneration); Gabrielle v. Craft, 75 A.D.2d 939, 428 N.Y.S.2d 84
(App. Div. 1980) (lack of sale fatal to action under dram shop act); Manning v. Andy, 454 Pa. 237,
310 A.2d 75 (1973) (only licensed persons engaged in sale of alcohol are civilly liable under dram
shop act).
100. Ross v. Ross, 294 Minn. 115,200 N.W.2d 149 (1972).
101. Williams v. Klemsrud, 197 N.W.2d 614 (Iowa 1972).
102. See infra notes 107 & 116.
103. 197 N.W.2d 614 (Iowa 1972).
104. Williams v. Klemsrud, 197 N.W.2d 614, 616 (Iowa 1972). The court also held that
contributory negligence was not a defense to the action. Id. at 617.
105. Id. at 615. RobertJohn Neis, a minor, had solicited the defendant and provided the money
to purchase the alcohol. Id.
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and subsequently was involved in an automobile collision with the
plaintiff. 106 At that time, the Iowa Code provided:
Every . .

.

person who shall be injured in person or

property . . .by any intoxicated person . . .shall have a

right of action . . . against any person who shall, by
selling or giving to another contrary to the provisions of
this title any intoxicating liquors, cause the intoxication
of such person, for all damages actually sustained, as well
as exemplary damages.

07

1

The court distinguished the general rule denying recovery
from a social host' 0 and found that the states, which apply the rule,
interpreted their dram shop acts as penal in nature. 10 9 The Iowa
courts, however, had construed the Iowa Dram Shop Act to be
remedial or compensatory in nature. 110 Therefore, by liberally
construing the statute, the Williams court upheld the trial court's
ruling that the Iowa Dram Shop Act included those individuals not
involved in the sale of intoxicating liquors. "'
The Minnesota Supreme Court extended dram shop liability
to a noncommercial vendor in Ross v. Ross. 112 In Ross the decedent,
a minor, was furnished alcoholic beverages by his older brother, the
defendant."13 The decedent consumed the alcohol and subsequently
was killed in an automobile accident allegedly caused by his
intoxication." 4 The decedent's parents and infant son brought a
wrongful death action against the decedent's brother. 115
106. Id. The defendant's answer alleged that the plaintiff was operating the vehicle in which the
second plaintiff was a passenger. Id. Defendant asserted that although the plaintiff stopped at a stop
sign before proceeding onto the highway, the plaintiff negligently made a left hand turn in front of
the minor's vehicle, which struck plaintiff's vehicle from the rear. Id. Under these alleged facts, the
defendant contended that the plaintiff's negligence was the proximate cause of the collision. Id.
107. IowA CODE ANN. 5 129.2 (1949). In 1972 the Iowa Legislature amended its dram shop act
to limit recovery to a sale or giving of intoxicating liquor by a licensee or permittee. IOWA CODE ANN.
5 123.92 (West Supp. 1982).
108. Williams, 197 N.W.2d at 615. The court noted that most of the cases addressing the social
host issue were decided in Illinois. Id.
109. Id. The penal character of a statute requires that it be strictly construed. Id. Strict
construction of a dram shop act requires that the act only include those individuals or organizations
in the business of selling intoxicating liquor. Id.
110. Id. The court stated that it had "rejected rules of strict construction which would limit the
scope of the act and thus impair the remedy and advance the mischief sought to be corrected." Id.
(citing Wendelin v. Russell, 259 Iowa 1152, 1158, 147 N.W.2d 188, 192 (1966)).
North Dakota, although it has not addressed the issue of social host liability, has also construed
its dram shop act to be remedial in nature. Izler v. Jorda, 80 N.W.2d 665, 667 (N.D. 1957).
111. 197 N.W.2d at 616.
112. 294 Minn. 115, 200 N.W.2d 149 (1972).
113. Ross v. Ross, 294 Minn. 115, 116, 200 N.W.2d 149, 150 (1972). OnJuly 13, 1967, defendants Delmar Ross andJoel OwenJohnson purchased liquor for 19-year-old Rodney Alan Ross.
Id.
114. Id. The trial jury, by special verdict, found that the decedent's intoxication proximately
caused his death. Id.
115. Id. The court noted that "[a]lthough the negligence of a decedent is a defense in an
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The Minnesota court held that liability under the dram shop
was predicated on the existence of an illegal transaction. 1 7
The court stated:
act' 1 6

Where liquor is furnished in a purely social setting,
ordinarily it may be expected that the donor will take
some precautions to determine the age of the recipient or
his state of intoxication. While the act applies to those
invited to wedding receptions and company picnics as
well as to other gatherings where supervision may be
onerous, no reason occurs to us why those who furnish
liquor to others, even on social occasions, should not be
responsible for protecting innocent third persons from the
potential dangers of indiscriminately furnishing such
hospitality.1 18
Therefore, the court imposed liability upon the defendant under
the Minnesota Dram Shop Act.' 19
Both Ross and Klensrud provoked a legislative response to the
courts' liberal construction of the respective dram shop acts. The
Minnesota Legislature effectively overruled Ross by amending the
act to exclude the word "giving.' 120 The legislature evidently
intended that the statute apply only to commercial vendors of
alcoholic beverages and not to social hosts. '21 The Iowa Legislature
responded to the Klemsrud decision by repealing the existing statute
and substituting a statute that limited damage recoveries to
instances involving the giving or sale of alcoholic beverages by
ordinary wrongful death action, and one who voluntarily becomes intoxicated cannot recover for his
own injury under the Dramshop Act, . . . a spouse, child, or parent may recover for loss of support
notwithstanding the ... decedent became voluntarily intoxicated .... " Id. at - n.2, 200 N.W.2d
at 150 n.2 (citations omitted).

116. At the time of the Ross case Minnesota's dram shop act provided:
Every ... person who is injured in person or property, or means of support, by any
intoxicated person, or by the intoxication of any person, has a right of action . . .
against any person who, by illegally selling, bartering or giving intoxicating liquors,
caused the intoxication ofsuch person, for all damages sustained ....
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 340.95 (West 1972).
In 1977 the Minnesota Dram Shop Act was amended to exclude the word "giving." MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 340.95 (West Supp. 1982). The Minnesota Supreme Court has construed the legislative intent as an attempt to insulate all social hosts from liability by deleting the word "giving"
from the dram shop act. Gary v. Coleman, 315 N.W.2d 593, 595 (Minn. 1982).
117. 294 Minn. at 121, 200 N.W.2d at 153. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 340.73 (West 1972 & Supp.
1982) (statute defines persons to whom sales are illegal).
118. 294 Minn. at 121-22, 200 N.W.2d at 153 (footnote omitted).
119. Id.
120. See supra note 116.
121. See supra note 116.
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licensees or permittees. 122
C.

POLICY REASONS

FOR DENYING

SOCIAL HOST

LIABILITY

UNDER DRAM SHOP ACTS

A survey of case law indicates that dram shop liability will
probably not extend to social hosts. 123 A major reason is that the
dram shop acts provide for strict liability against the offending

party. 124 Courts find that the imposition of the same standard of
liability upon a social host as that imposed upon a commercial
vendor of alcohol is manifestly unfair. The injustice results from the
vendor's ability to insure himself against liability and pass the cost

of this insurance on to his customers. 125 The social host, however,
would have to absorb the cost of insurance himself. 126
Another reason for the courts' reluctance to extend dram shop
act liability to the social host is the courts' interpretation that these
statutes are penal rather than remedial. 127 This penal interpretation
requires a strict construction of the statutes. 128 Courts, in
construing dram shop acts, have looked to the acts' legislative
histories and determined that the legislatures only intended to
impose liability upon commercial vendors when they drafted the
acts. 129 Based on this finding, courts refuse to judicially extend
liability under dram shop acts to social hosts. Rather, this extension
30
is left to the discretion of the legislature. 1
Finally, a commercial vendor is presumed to know the extent
of his liability under a dram shop act, and therefore, he is in a
better position to regulate the furnishing of alcohol to his
customers.' 3 ' Conversely, the social host often has little control
over the amount or rate of alcohol consumed by his guests. 132
The implication from the courts and policy discussions is that
122. See supra note 107.
123. For cases refusing to extend dram shop liability to a social host, see supra note 99.
124. Annot., 64 A.L.R.3D 849 (1975). Typically, under a dram shop act one who causes
intoxication by selling or furnishing alcoholic beverages to another is responsible for damages to a
third person caused by such intoxication. Id. at 852. Thus, liability is imposed merely upon the proof
of a statutory violation. Id. Some cases holding that contributory negligence is not a defense to a
dram shop action have pointed out that the basis of a dram shop action is not negligence, but
statutory violation. Id. See 48A C.J.S. IntoxicatingLiquor § 431 (1981) (actionable grounds under dram
shop act).
125. Graham, supra note 14, at 568.
126. Graham, supra note 14, at 568.
127. See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
128. McGough, supra note 22, at 453-54.
129. See Cruse v. Aden, 127 Ill, 231, 20 N.E. 73 (1889); Miller v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 48
Ill. App. 2d 412, 199 N.E.2d 300 (Ct. App. 1964).
130. See, e.g., Camille v. Berry Fertilizers, Inc., 30 Ill. App. 3d 1050, 334 N.E.2d 205 (App. Ct.
1975); Gabrielle v. Craft, 75 A.D.2d 939, 428 N.Y.S.2d 84 (App. Div. 1980).

131. Graham, supra note 14, at 568.
132. Graham, supra note 14, at 568.
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dram shop liability will probably not be extended to the social host
in those jurisdictions that have not addressed the issue. Dram shop
actions, however, are not the only means of imposing liability onthe social host; some courts have extended liability under a tort
theory based on a violation of an alcoholic beverage control act.
III. ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL ACTS
A.

HISTORY OF THE EXTENSION OF CIVIL LIABILITY UNDER
PENAL CONTROL ACTS

A second theory applied by courts to impose civil liability upon
a social host for injuries caused by an intoxicated guest is based on
alcoholic beverage control acts. 133 Courts construe these statutes to
create a statutory standard of care for the social host.1 34 These
statutes have been enacted in all states 135 to regulate the
distribution or sale of intoxicating liquor to individuals who pose a
potentially high risk of danger to the general public.1 36 Generally,
these statutes forbid the sale1 37 or giving1 38 of intoxicating liquor to
1 40
minors 139 or obviously intoxicated persons.
Generally, violations of these statutes are criminal
misdemeanor offenses. 1 41 Recently, however, courts have applied
these criminal statutes to impose civil liability for injuries to third
persons caused by an intoxicated person served in violation of an
alcoholic beverage control act. 142 Most courts justify imposition of
133. Comment, Torts - Social Host Who FurnishesAlcoholic Beverages Is Liablefor Damage Caused by
Consumer, 10 TEx. TECH L. REV. 297, 300 (1978).
134. Graham, supranote 14, at 569.
135. For a list of the alcoholic beverage control statutes, see supranote 12.
136. Graham, supranote 14, at 569-70.
137. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 35-4-78 (1977) (statute applies only to the sale of alcoholic
beverages).
138. E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 340.73 (West 1972 & Supp. 1982) (statute applies to both the sale
and the giving of alcohol); N.D. CENT. ConE § 5-01-09 (1975) (statute applies to the delivering of
alcoholic beverages).
139. E.g., ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, §§ 303, 1058 (West Supp. 1982) (prohibits sale to those
under 20 years old); N.D. CENT. CODE § 5-01-09 (1975) (prohibits delivering to persons under the
age of 21).
140. E.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 5-01-09 (1975) (prohibits delivering to intoxicated person,
habitual drunkard, minor, or an incompetent); TEx. ALCO. BEy. CoDE ANN. tit. 4, § 101.63 (Vernon
1978) (prohibits sale to a habitual drunkard, an intoxicated person, or an insane person).
141. See ALAsKA STAT. § 04.16.180 (1973); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4-246 (West Supp. 1982);
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 48-901 (1977); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 25602, 25658 (West 1964 & Supp.
1982); CoLo. REv. STAT. § 12-46-114 (1978 & Supp. 1982); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 4, § 713(b) (1975);
GA. CODE ANN. § 5A-519 (c) (Supp. 1982); IDAHO CODE § 23-605 (1977); ILL. ANN. STAT. § 131(b)
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 7.1-5-10-14 to -15 (Burns 1978 & Supp. 1982); MD.
ANN. CODE art. 2B, §§ 118-119 (Supp. 1982); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 340.73 (West Supp. 1982); Miss.
CODE ANN. §§ 67-1-81, -83 (Supp. 1982); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 311.310 (Vernon 1963); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 202.055 (1981); N.D. CENT. CODE § 5-01-09 (1975); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 3-8-11.2 (1976); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 35-4-78 (1978); TENN. CODE ANN. § 57-5-303 (1980); TEx. ALco. BEy. CODE
ANN. tit. 4, §§ 101.63, 106.03 (Vernon 1978); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 12-6-101 (1981).
142. E.g., Nazareno v. Urie, 638 P.2d 671 (Alaska 1981) (imposed liability on a tavern owner
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civil liability based on a criminal statute under the theory that
violation of the statute is negligence per se. 143 According to Dean
Prosser:
The fact that ... legislation ... carries with it a criminal
penalty, will not prevent its use in imposing civil liability

Perhaps the most satisfactory explanation [for
imposing civil liability under a criminal statute] is that the
courts are seeking, by something in the nature of judicial
legislation, to further the ultimate policy for the
protection of individuals which they find underlying the
statute, and which they believe the legislature must have
1 44
had in mind.
Generally, for the violation of a penal statute to provide the
basis for civil liability, the plaintiff must prove the following
elements: the plaintiff was a member of the class for whose
protection the statute was enacted 145 and the harm suffered by the
plaintiff was of the kind the statute was intended to prevent. 146
Earlier courts rejected these statutes as a basis for liability
because they considered the proximate cause of injuries to be the
consumption of liquor rather than the furnishing of liquor. 147
Recently, however, courts have not required that the plaintiff prove
causation because a presumption exists that an unexcused violation
14 8
of the penal statute is negligence per se.
for injuries caused by intoxicated patron); Linn v. Rand, 140 N.J. Super. 212, 356 A.2d 15 (Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1976) (imposed liability on social host for injuries caused by intoxicated guest);
Wiener v. Gamma Phi Chapter of Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, 258 Or. 632, 485 P.2d 18 (1971)
(imposed civil liability on a fraternity for injuries caused by minor who became intoxicated at a
fraternity party).
143. E.g., Vance v. United States, 355 F. Supp. 756 (D. Alaska 1973) (violation is negligence
per se); Mickey v. Stamatis, 63 Ariz. 293, 162 P.2d 128 (1945) (violation is negligence per se);
Prevatt v. McClennan, 201 So. 2d 780 (Fla. App. 1967) (violation is negligence per se); Brattain v.
Herron, 159 Ind. App. 684, 309 N.E.2d 150 (Ct. App. 1974) (violation is negligence per se); Trail v.
Christian, 298 Minn. 101, 213 N.W.2d 618 (1973) (violation is negligence per se); Taggart v.
Bitzenhofer, 35 Ohio App. 2d 23, 299 N.E.2d 901 (Ct. App. 1972) (violation is negligence per se);
Smith v. Clark, 411 Pa. 142, 190 A.2d 441 (1963) (violation is negligence). But see Thompson v.
Bryson, 19 Ariz. App. 134, 505 P.2d 572 (Ct. App. 1973) (violation of statute does not create civil
liability in and of itselt); Carr v. Turner, 238 Ark. 889, 385 S.W.2d 656 (1965) (refused to extend
civil liability to social host under alcoholic beverage control statute); Garcia v. Hargrove, 52 Wis. 2d
289, 190 N.W.2d 181 (1971) (refused to extend civil liability to tavern owner even though violation
ofstatute was negligence per se).
144. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 36, at 190-91 (4th ed. 1971) (footnotes omitted).
145. Id. at 192.
146. Id. at 200-01. See Comment, supra note 133, at 301-02.
147. Comment, Torts - Negligence Liability of Social Hostfor FurnishingLiquor to Guest Who Later
Injuresa ThirdPerson, 25 WAYNE L. REv. 975, 977 (1979).
148. Note, Social Host Liabilityfor FurnishingLiquor - Findinga Basisfor Recovery in Kentucky, 3 N.
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The first major decision construing an alcoholic beverage
control statute to impose civil liability upon a commercial vendor
was Rappaport v. Nichols.149 In Rappaport the New Jersey Supreme
Court held a tavern owner liable for a third person's injuries under
a theory of statutory negligence. 150 The defendants, commercial
vendors, 15 1 sold alcoholic beverages to a minor who became
intoxicated after consuming the alcohol. 152 While intoxicated, the
minor operated a motor vehicle and was involved in a collision that
killed the decedent. 153 The court declared that the negligent
operation of an automobile by an intoxicated person is a foreseeable
intervening cause of the third person's injuries. 154 Therefore, the
court found the furnishing of alcohol to the minor was the
55
proximate cause of the accident. 1
The Rappaport court, finding that a tort duty extended from the
tavern owner to an injured third party, reasoned that "these
broadly expressed [statutory] restrictions were not narrowly
intended to benefit the minors and intoxicated persons alone but
were wisely intended for the protection of members of the general
public as well."' 156 The court noted that the extension of this tort
duty would afford a "fairer measure of justice to innocent third
parties"' 157 injured as a result of a violation of the New Jersey
Alcoholic Beverage Control Act. 15 8 Such a duty would "not place
any unjustifiable burdens upon defendants who can always
59
discharge their civil responsibilites by the exercise of due care."1
The Rappaport decision initiated a court trend toward applying
penal statutes to establish civil liability. 160 Courts began holding
Ky. L. REv. 229, 238 (1976).
149.31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959).
150. Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959).
151. Id. at 190, 156 A.2d at 3. The plaintiff alleged that Nichols, a minor, had consumed
alcohol in four taverns prior to the accident. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. Nichols, while driving under the influence of alcohol, collided with a car operated by
Arthur Rappaport. Id. Rappaport died as a result of the injuries received in the collision. Id. The
plaintiff, Rappaport's wife, brought an action for damages as the representative of Rappaport's
estate and in her individual capacity as the owner of the car. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 204, 156 A.2d at 9.
156. Id. at 202, 156 A.2d at 8. The Rappaport court extended the protection of the statute from
minors and intoxicated persons to the general public. The court found:
When alcoholic beverages are sold by a tavern keeper to a minor or to an
intoxicated person, the unreasonable risk of harm not only to the minor but also to
members of the traveling public may be readily recognized and foreseen; this is
particularly evident in current times when traveling by car to and from the tavern is so
commonplace and accidents resulting from drinking are so frequent.
Id.
157.
158,
159.
160.

Id. at 205, 156 A.2d at 10.
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., Deeds v. United States, 306 F. Supp. 348 (D. Mont. 1969); Brockett v. Kitchen
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that violations of criminal statutes provided the basis for a civil
action if the violation resulted in an invasion of an interest that the
statute was designed to protect. 161 The courts, rejecting earlier
precedent, 162 began holding that consumption was only an
intervening cause; the proximate cause of the third person's
injuries was the sale or furnishing of alcohol. 163 Accordingly, courts
extended civil liability under alcoholic beverage control acts to the
64
commercial vendors of intoxicating liquors.1
B.

SOCIAL

HOST

LIABILITY

UNDER

ALCOHOLIC

BEVERAGE

CONTROL ACTS

Courts have extended civil liability to commercial vendors for
injuries caused by intoxicated persons served in violation of
alcoholic beverage control statutes. 16 The courts predicate liability
on a finding that the purpose of the statutes is to protect the general
public from injuries caused by the excessive use of intoxicating
liquor. 166 Courts have varied, however, when addressing whether
civil liability extends to noncommercial vendors under alcoholic
beverage control statutes.
1 67
Prior to amending its alcoholic beverage control statute,
California was the leading jurisdiction extending civil liability to
noncommercial vendors. In 1971 the California Supreme Court
68
abolished the common law consumption rule in Vesley v. Sager.1
The court held that furnishing alcoholic beverages to an intoxicated
person could be the proximate cause of any third person injuries
Boyd Motor Co., 24 Cal. App. 3d 87, 100 Cal. Rptr. 752 (Ct. App. 1972); Linn v. Rand, 140 N.J.
Super. 212, 356 A.2d 15 (Super. Ct. App. Di-. 1976): Wiener v. Gamma Phi chapter of Alpha Tau
Omega Fraternity, 258 Or. 632, 485 P.2d 18 (1971).
161. See, e.g., Giardina v. Solomon, 360 F. Supp. 262, 263 (M.D. Pa. 1973); Jardine v. Upper
198 A.2d 550, 553 (1964).
Darby Lodge No. 1973, 413 Pa. 626,-.,
162. 45 AM. JUR. 2D Intoxicating Liquors 5 553 (1969). Under the common law theory, courts
considered the consumption of the alcohol rather than the sale or furnishing of alcohol to be the
proximate cause of the injuries to the third party. Id. The courts based the rationale for this rule on
the Protestant ethic that a person should admit his wrongful conduct and accept individual
responsibility for the consequences of his behavior. Keenan, Liquor Law Liability in California, 14
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 46, 48 (1973); Johnson, Drunken Driving- The Civil Responsibility of the Purveyor
qfIntoxicating Liquors, 37 IND. L.J. 317, 323 (1962).
163. See, e.g., Adamian v. Three Sons, Inc., 233 N.E.2d 18 (Mass. 1968); Mitchell v. Ketner,
54 Tenn. App. 656, 393 S.W.2d 755 (Ct. App. 1964).
164. For cases extending civil liability under alcoholic beverage control statutes, see supra note
160.
165. Seesupra note 160.
-. , 141 Cal. Rptr. 267, 271 (Ct. App. 1977)
166. Coffman v. Kennedy, 74 Cal. App. 3d 28,
(citing Vesely v. Sager, 5 Cal. 3d 153. 164-65, 486 P.2d 151, 156, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623, 631 (1971)).
167. In 1978 the California Legislature amended its alcoholic beverage control act to provide
that the consumption. rather than the selling or furnishing, of alcohol was the proximate cause of an
injury inflicted on another by an intoxicated person. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25602 (West
Supp. 1982): California Supreme Court Surey 1982. 9 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 784, 785 n.4 (1982).
168.5 Cal. 3d 153. 486 P.2d 151.95 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1971).

1983]

NOTE

resulting from the intoxicated person's actions.1

69

The California Court of Appeals, in Brockett v. Kitchen Boyd
Motor Co., 170 extended the rationale of Vesely to impose liability
upon an employer who dispensed copious amounts of alcohol to a

minor employee. 17 1 In Brockett the employer provided the minor
with alcohol at a Christmas party. 172 After the minor became

intoxicated, the employer placed the minor in a car and directed
him to drive home. 17 3 The court noted that the Vesely logic
"impel[led] the conclusion that any person, whether he is in the

business of dispensing alcoholic beverages or not, who disregards
the legislative mandate breaches a duty to anyone who is injured as
a result of the minor's intoxication and for whose benefit the statute

was enacted.' 174 The court, however, specifically limited its
5
holding to the facts of the case. 17
The California courts extended the Vesely rationale several
times.1 76 Finally, the court's rationale reached its logical extreme in
Coulter v. Superior Court.177 In Coulter the plaintiff brought an action
against the owners and the manager of an apartment complex for

injuries received in an automobile collision with an intoxicated
driver. 178 The plaintiff alleged that the defendants were negligent in

serving the motorist "extremely

large amounts of alcohol"

knowing that he was already intoxicated and that he intended to
169. Vesely v. Sager, 5 Cal. 3d 153, 164, 486 P.2d 151, 159, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623, 631 (1971).
Defendant Sager engaged in the business of selling alcoholic beverages to the public and owned a
lodge near the top of Mt. Blady. 5 Cal. 3d at 157-58, 486 P.2d at 154, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 626. He
permitted O'Connell to be served a large quantity of alcohol, knowing that O'Connell would have to
drive down a steep winding road on his way home. Id. After leaving the lodge, O'Connell proceeded
down the mountain, swerved into the oncoming traffic, and collided with the plaintiff's vehicle. Id.
170.24 Cal. App. 3d 87, 100 Cal. Rptr. 752 (Ct. App. 1972).
171. Brockett v. Kitchen Boyd Motor Co., 24 Cal. App. 3d 87, 94, 100 Cal. Rptr. 752, 756
(Ct. App. 1972).
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 93, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 756.
175. Id. The court termed the facts of the case as extreme. Id. at 88-89, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 752-53.
The defendant, knowing that he had served the minor to the point of intoxication, placed the minor
in a car and directed him to drive through city traffic. Id.
176. See Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 16 Cal. 3d 313, 546 P.2d 719, 128 Cal. Rptr. 215 (1976).
The Bernhardcase involved an individual who had been served intoxicating liquors at the defendant's
casino. Id. at 325, 546 P.2d at 726, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 222-23. The plaintiff was injured as a result of
an automobile collision caused by the intoxicated individual. Id. The court held that the plaintiff's
action alleging civil liability based on principles of negligence was not barred even though the
defendant violated no statutory duty. Id.
See also Coffman v. Kennedy, 74 Cal. App. 3d 28, 141 Cal. Rptr. 267 (Ct. App. 1977). The
Coffman case involved a motorist who was injured in a collision with an automobile driven by an
intoxicated driver. 74 Cal. App. 3d at 31, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 269. The plaintiff brought an action
against the intoxicated driver's passenger on several theories, one of which claimed that the
passenger was negligent in failing to control the intoxicated driver. Id. at 31-32, 141 Cal. Rptr. at
269. The court noted, in dicta, that a social host could be liable ifhe serves alcoholic beverages to an
obviously intoxicated person whom he expects will drive a vehicle on the public highways. Id. at 37,
141 Cal. Rptr. at 272.
177.21 Cal. 3d 144, 577 P.2d 669, 145 Cal. Rptr. 534 (1978).
178. Coulter v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 3d 144, 577 P.2d 669, 145 Cal. Rptr. 534 (1978).
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drive an automobile. 179 The court noted that the legislature failed
to amend section 25602 of the California Business and Professional
Code to exclude civil liability following the Vesely decision. 180
Therefore, it broadly held that civil liability could be imposed upon
a noncommercial supplier who creates a foreseeable risk of harm to
third persons by providing alcoholic beverages to an obviously
intoxicated person. 181
Less than one year later the California Legislature overruled
the Coulter decision. In 1978 the legislature amended section 25602
of the California Business and Professional Code to read:
(b) No person who sells, furnishes, gives, or causes to
be sold, furnished, or given away, any alcoholic beverage
. . . shall be civilly liable to any injured person or the
estate of such person for injuries inflicted on that person
as a result of intoxication by the consumer of such
alcoholic beverage.
(c) The Legislature hereby declares that this section
shall be interpreted so that the holdings in cases such as
Vesely v. Sager (5 Cal. 3d 153), Bernhard v. Harrah's
Club (16 Cal. 3d 313) and Coulter v. Superior Court
(Cal. 3d -) be abrogated in favor of prior judicial
interpretation finding the consumption of alcoholic
beverages rather than the serving of alcoholic beverages
as the proximate cause of injuries inflicted upon another
82
by an intoxicated person. 1
Thus, with one exception, 18 3 the legislature reinstated the common
law rule that the proximate cause of injury to a third person is the
179. Id. at 148, 577 P.2d at 671, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 536. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant
knew or should have known that serving alcohol to an obviously intoxicated person would expose
third persons, including the plaintiff, to "foreseeable serious risk of harm." Id.
180. Id. at 152, 577 P.2d at 673, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 538. The court stated:
[I]n 1971 the Legislature was put on notice by Vesely that (1) section 25602 could form
the basis for imposition of civil liability upon social hosts because identifying the object
of the statute, we recognized that it was "adopted for the purpose of protecting
members of the general public from injuries to person and damage to property
resulting from the excessive use of intoxicating liquor". . . and (2) the noncommercial
supplier's civil liability for a violation of section 25602 remained an open question.
Id. (citations omitted). The court found the legislature's failure to react to Vesely significant, but not
controlling. Id.
181. Id.
182. CAL. BUS. & PROF. COD § 25602 (b), (c) (West Supp. 1983). The legislature retained the
original portion of the statute, which provided: "Every person who sells, furnishes, gives, or causes
to be sold, furnished, or given away, any alcoholic beverage to any habitual or common drunkard or
to any obviously intoxicated person is guilty of a misdemeanor." Id. § 25602(a).
183. The legislature passed § 25602.1, which provided:
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consumption of alcohol. 184 The exception provides for a cause of
action against a licensed provider who serves alcoholic beverages to
an obviously intoxicated minor who subsequently causes injury to
third persons. 185 This legislative action indicates that in California
the legislature did not intend to create a common law tort action
18 6
through an alcoholic beverage control statute.
Although California refuses to impose civil liability on a social
host under an alcoholic beverage control act, other jurisdictions do
impose such liability. 18 7 In Giardina v. Solomon 188 a Pennsylvania
federal district court held that a purely private organization that
serves liquor as a social courtesy could be civilly liable under the
Pennsylvania act. 18 9 The plaintiff alleged that he was assaulted by
the intoxicated defendant Solomon. 190 He further alleged that the
defendant fraternity violated the statute by serving alcohol to
Solomon, a highly intoxicated minor. 19 ' The court denied the
defendant's summary judgment motion and found that the
fraternity was liable because the statutory violation resulted in the
1 92
invasion of an interest that the statute was designed to protect.
19
3
The Indiana Court of Appeals, in Brattain v. Herron, found
1 94
that the purpose of the Indiana Alcoholic Beverage Control Act
was to protect the citizenry of the state. 195 The plaintiff alleged that
a minor became intoxicated at the home of his sister. 196 On his way
Notwith.standing subdivision (b) of Section 25602, a cause of action may be
brought by or on behalf of any person who has suffered injury or death against any
person licensed ... who sells, furnishes, gives or causes to be sold, furnished or given
away any alcoholic beverage to any obviously intoxicated minor where the furnishing,
sale or giving of such beverage to the minor is the proximate cause of the personal
injury or death sustained by such person.
Id. §25602.1.
184. Id. 5 25602(c).
185. Id. § 25602. 1(a).
186. Graham, supra note 14, at 573. The constitutionality of the statutory amendment was
upheld in Cory v. Shierloh, 229 Cal. 3d 320, 629 P.2d 8, 174 Cal. Rptr. 500 (1981).
187. See Keenan, Liquor Law Liability in California, 14 SANTA CLARA L. Rav. 46 (1973-1974).
188. 360 F. Supp. 262 (M.D. Pa. 1973).
189. Giardina v. Solomon, 360 F. Supp. 262, 263 (M.D. Pa. 1973). Pennsylvania's beverage
control act provided that "Jilt shall be unlawful ... [flor any. . . person, to sell, furnish or give any
liquor ... to any person visibly intoxicated, or to any insane person, or to any minor, or to habitual
drunkards, or persons of known intemperate habits." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 4-493(1) (Purdon
1969).
190.360 F. Supp. at 263.
191. Id.
192. Id. The court found that the purpose of § 4-493 was to avoid injuries to third parties. Id.
The court determined that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would not follow its prior decision in
Manning v. Andy, 459 Pa. 237, 310 A.2d 75 (1973), which held that one who gives liquor to another
as an act of social courtesy is not liable to injured third parties. 360 F. Supp. at 263.
193. 159 Ind. App. 663, 309 N.E. 2d 150 (Ct. App. 1974).
194. IND. ANN. STAT. § 12-610 (Burns 1956). The statute provided that "[n]o alcoholic beverages shall be sold... given, provided or furnished, to any person under the age of twenty one." Id.
309 N.E.2d 150, 155-66 (Ct. App. 1974)
195. Brattain v. Herron, 159 Ind. App. 663, -,
(citing Fisher v. Elder, 247 Ind. 598, 217 N.E.2d 847 (1966)).
196. 155 Ind. App. at -, 309 N.E.2d at 152. The defendant did not object when the minor
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home the minor was involved in an automobile collision in which
four people were killed. 197 The court held that the defendant sister
who provided alcohol to the minor with the knowledge that he
would operate a motor vehicle was civilly liable under the
statute. 198 To date, the Indiana Legislature has not overruled the
court's decision. 199
In Linn v. Rand2°° the Superior Court of New Jersey applied a
somewhat different analysis to extend civil liability to a social
host. 20 1 In Linn an infant brought an action for injuries he received
when struck by a car driven by the minor defendant. 20 2 The
plaintiff alleged that the minor was served alcoholic beverages in
the home of the defendant. 20 3 The court refused to strictly construe
the statute, which prohibited the sale of alcohol to a minor, 20 4 and
extended the Rappaport decision to social hosts. 20 5 The court stated
that "[i]t makes little sense to say that the licensee in Rappaport is
under a duty to exercise care, but give immunity to a social host
who may be guilty of the same wrongful conduct merely because he
is unlicensed. "206 The court found that furnishing alcoholic
beverages to a minor in a social setting does not provide immunity
to the host for his guests' negligent acts that proximately cause
injury to an innocent third party. 207
The Rappaport-Linn analysis was extended by the New Jersey
Superior Court to its logical limits in Figuly v. Knoll.20 8 The plaintiff
brought an action against a social host and an adult guest for
injuries the plaintiff received in a motor vehicle collision. 20 9 The
plaintiff alleged that the host negligently allowed the guest to
become intoxicated. 21 0 The court dismissed the defendant's
and his friend helped themselves to whiskey and beer from her refrigerator. Id. The court found her
309 N.E.2d at 158.
lack of objection to be a violation ofthe statute. Id. at-,
197. Id. at -, 309 N.E.2d at 152.
198. Id. at -, 309 N.E.2d at 150. The court followed the Vesely and Brockett rationale that vendors and social hosts who violate the alcoholic beverage control statutes are civilly liable. Id. at__,
309 N.E.2d at 157.
199. See IND. CODE ANN. §§ 7.1-5-7-8, -10-14, -10-15 (Burns Supp. 1982).
200. 140 N.J. Super., 212, 356 A.2d 15 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976).
356 A.2d 15, 19 (Super. Ct. App. Div.
201. See Linn v. Rand, 140 N.J. Super. 212, -,
1976).
365 A.2d at 15.
202. Id. at-,
203. Id. The trial court had granted a motion for summary judgment in favor of the defendant.

Id.
356 A.2d at 19.
204. Id. at.,
205. Id. at
, 356 A.2d at 17-18.
206. Id. at-.,
356 A.2d at 18.
207. Id. at -, 356 A.2d at 19.
208. 185 N.J. Super. 477, 449 A.2d 564 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1982).
209. Figuly v. Knoll, 185 N.J. Super. 477, 449 A.2d 564 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1982). The
defendant Longfield invited codefendant Knoll to his party. Id. Knoll became obviously intoxicated
after five hours ofdrinking. Id.
210. Id. Longfield had worked as a commercial bartender and was aware of Knoll's alcoholic
tendencies. Id.
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summary judgment motion and found that no reasonable basis
existed for limiting the holding of Linn to minors. 211 The court held
"it to be the law of this State that a social host who furnishes
alcoholic beverages to any obviously intoxicated person under
circumstances which create a reasonably foreseeable risk of harm to
others may be held legally responsible to those third persons who
2 12
are injured when that harm occurs." ,
Despite the trend in some jurisdictions to extend civil liability
to a social host under alcoholic beverage control statutes, several
courts have refused to extend this liability. 2 13 The courts'
rationale for restricting coverage to tavern owners is that the
statutes were designed to regulate the liquor industry, rather than
social hosts. 214 In jurisdictions with less restrictive statutory
language than New Jersey, 21 5 courts have refused to extend liability
21 6
based on strict statutory construction.
The Pennsylvania Superior Court in Couts v. Ghion2 1 7 stated:
Despite the language of. . . the Liquor Code that it is
unlawful for "any . . . person" to provide intoxicating
beverages to a visibly intoxicated person, our Supreme
Court has refused to impose civil liability for violation of
this provision on persons who are not licensed and
21 8
engaged in the sale of intoxicants. 1
In Hulse v. Driver21 9 the Washington Court of Appeals stated that if
civil liability is to be extended to a social host, "such a policy
decision should be made by the legislature after full investigation,
debate and examination of the relative merits of the conflicting
positions. ' 220 In Holmes v. Circo2 21 the Nebraska Supreme Court
refused to impose a statutory duty to a third party on a tavern
owner. Rather, the court stated that the purpose "of a prohibitory
211. 185 N.J. Super. at .
449 A.2d at 565.
212. Id.
213. See, e.g., Carrv. Turner. 238 Ark. 889. 385 S.W.2d 656 (1965): Manning v. Andy, 454 Pa.
237. 310 A.2d 75 (1973).
214. Edgar v. Kajet. 84 Misc. 2d 100. 375 N.Y.S.2d 548 (Sup. Ct. 1975), aff'd, 55 A.D.2d 597,
389 N.Y.S.2d 631 (App. Div. 1976): Hulse v. Driver, 11 Wash. App. 509. 524 P.2d 255 (Ct. App.
1974).
215. See N.J. STAT. AN%. §§ 33:1-39.-77 (West Supp. 1981).
216. Graham. supra note 14. at 575.
217. 281 Pa. Super. 135. 421 A.2d 1184 (Super. Ct. 1980).
218. Couts v. Ghion. 281 Pa. Super. 135.
.
421 A.2d 1184. 1187 (Super. Ct. 1980) (citing
Manning v. Andy. 454 Pa. 237. 310 A.2d 75 (1973)).
219. 11 Wash. App. 509. 524 P.2d 255 (Ct. App. 1974).
220. Hulse v. Driver. 11 Wash. App. 509. -.
524 P.2d 255. 258 (Ct. App. 1974) (citing
Halvorson v. Birchfield Boiler. Inc.. 76 Wash. App. 2d 759. 765. 458 P.2d 897, 900 (Ct. App.
1969)).
221. 196 Neb. 496. 244 N.W.2d 65 (1976).
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statute. . . is to regulate the business of selling intoxicants, and not
222
to enlarge civil remedies."
C.

TREND TOWARD SOCIAL HOST LIABILITY UNDER ALCOHOLIC
BEVERAGE CONTROL ACTS

A survey of cases addressing whether civil liability should be
imposed upon a social host by an alcoholic beverage control statute
indicates that the trend may be toward the imposition of'such
liability. The California courts, despite the legislative response to

Coulter,223 have applied other theories to impose civil liability on
social hosts. 224 In Harrisv. Trojan Fireworks Co.225 the court adopted
the theory of respondeat superior to impose civil liability upon an
employer for injuries to a third person caused by an employee who
became intoxicated at a company Christmas party. 22 6 The court
found a sufficient connection between "the employment or the
employer's Christmas party and the employee's negligent act to
justify holding the employer financially responsible for the injuries
occasioned

by the employee's

accident.''227

The unhesitating

language of the opinion indicates the court's desire to impose civil
liability on the social host despite the legislative narrowing of the
228
California Alcoholic Beverage Control Act.
Various courts have developed policy arguments indicating
that an action against a social host should be available under an
alcoholic beverage control act. 229 These courts hold that a social
host should not be given immunity for his negligent acts merely
230
In Garcia v. Hargrove23 1
because he is a noncommercial vendor.

222. Holmes v. Circo, 196 Neb. 496, -,
244 N.W.2d 65, 67 (1976). See also Collier v.
Stamatis, 63 Ariz. 285, 162 P.2d 125 (1945) (purpose of statute is to regulate seller, not to impose
civil liability); Carr v. Turner, 238 Ark. 889, 385 S.W.2d 656 (1965) (statute did not abrogate
common law rule of nonliability); Lee v. Peerless Ins. Co., 248 La. 982, 183 So. 2d 328 (1966)
(statute did not abrogate common law rule of nonliability); Hamm v. Carson City Nugget, Inc., 85
Nev. 99, 450 P.2d 358 (1969) (violation of alcoholic beverage control act does not impose civil
liability); Garcia v. Hargrove, 46 Wis. 2d 724, 176 N.W.2d 566 (1970) (statute does not extend civil
liability).
223. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25602(b), (c) (West Supp. 1982).
224. See Cantor v. Anderson, 126 Cal. App. 3d 124, 178 Cal. Rptr. 540 (Ct. App. 1982); Harris
v. Trojan Fireworks, 120 Cal. App. 3d 157, 174 Cal. Rptr. 452 (Ct. App. 1981).
225. 120 Cal. App. 3d 157, 174 Cal. Rptr. 452 (Ct. App. 1981).
226. Harris v. Trojan Fireworks, 120 Cal. App. 3d 157, 163, 174 Cal. Rptr. 452, 456 (1981). See
Comment, Employers' Liabilityfor Drunken Employee's Actions Following an Office Party:A Cause of Action
UnderRespondeat Superior, 19 CAL. W.L. REv. 107 (1982).
227. 120 Cal. App. 3d at 164, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 456.
228. See 120 Cal. App. 3d at 165, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 457. See also CAL. Bus & PROF. CODE
525602.1 (West Supp. 1982). Section 25602.1 preserves a right of action to impose civil liability
upon a licensed person who sells or furnishes alcohol to a minor. Id.
229. See Coulter v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 3d at 154-56, 577 P.2d at 675, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 53940.
230. Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 NJ. at.-,
156 A.2d at 10.
231.46 Wis. 2d 724, 176 N.W.2d 566 (1970).
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the court stated that "[i]f the act of providing liquor to one already
intoxicated is a negligent act, then it remains a negligent act
regardless of who the supplier may be.' '232 The court noted that no
undue burden is imposed upon a social host by asking him to
exercise due care to protect the general public from his intoxicated
233
guests.
Some courts presume that the imposition of civil liability upon
a social host may reduce the incidence of accidents caused by drunk
drivers. 234 A Wisconsin court stated that "[i]f we are looking for a
deterrent for drinking, sole liability of the drunk driver will not
deter as effectively as liability for selling liquor to an inebriate one cannot drink if no one will sell or give him liquor." '2 35 Thus,
because of its deterrent effect, the social host should be held liable
for injuries resulting from the intoxication of an adult guest if such
intoxication is caused by the violation of an alcoholic beverage
236
control statute.
Similarly, little justification exists for not imposing civil
liability upon the social host who serves a minor in violation of an
alcoholic beverage control statute. A social host knows he is
violating the law when he serves intoxicating liquor to an underage
person. 23 7 Therefore, the social host has a duty and the present
ability to avoid serving alcoholic beverages to a minor.238
Accordingly, civil liability should be imposed upon the social host
for third party injuries caused by the negligent acts of an
intoxicated minor guest.
IV. COMMON LAW NEGLIGENCE PRINCIPLES

A.

APPLYING

COMMON

LAW

NEGLIGENCE

PRINCIPLES

TO

ALCOHOL VENDORS

At common law a seller or furnisher of alcoholic beverages was
not liable for injuries or damages caused by an intoxicated
individual. 239 The rationale for the common law rule was that the
consumption rather than the sale of the liquor was the proximate
232. Garcia v. Hargrove, 46 Wis. 2d 724, 734, 176 N.W.2d 566, 571 (1970).
233. Id.
234. Coulter v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 3d at 154, 577 P.2d at 675, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 540.
235. 46 Wis. 2d at 740, 176 N.W.2d at 574.
236. Comment, supra note 226, at 116 n.54. The violation results from serving an obviously
intoxicated adult when it is foreseeable that the intoxication could cause harm to an innocent third
party. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Collier v. Stamatis, 63 Ariz. 285, __, 162 P.2d 125, 126 (1945); State ex rel. Joyce v.

Hatfield, 197 Md. 249,

__,78 A.2d 754, 756 (1951).
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courts have expressly

abrogated the common law rule by reasoning that personal injury is
a foreseeable consequence of serving an intoxicated individual
more liquor. 24 1 These courts hold that furnishing liquor is the
proximate cause of injuries inflicted on a third person by an
intoxicated individual. One court indicated that "such furnishing
is a proximate cause . . . because the consumption, resulting in
intoxication, and injury producing conduct are foreseeable
intervening causes. ' ' 242 Thus, these courts recognize that a
tortfeasor is not relieved from liability for the foreseeable acts of
243
others.
Courts using this rationale extend a common law negligence
duty to tavern owners when the sale of alcohol is found to be a
substantial factor in causing the plaintiff's injury.244 In jurisdictions
abrogating the common law rule of nonliability, courts place the
vendor under a duty not to sell liquor to an individual when the sale
245
creates a foreseeable risk of harm to the customer or to others.
Thus, by abrogating the nonliability rule and imposing a duty,
courts allow a negligence action to be brought against the tavern
owner. 246
The Idaho Supreme Court in Alegria v. Payonk24 7 recently
extended this common law negligence duty to tavern owners. 248 In
Alegria the plaintiff alleged that the defendant served a minor
alcoholic beverages when he knew the minor was underage and
obviously intoxicated. 249 The minor, while driving in this
intoxicated condition, collided with the plaintiffs vehicle. 250 The
court found that one owes a "duty to every person in our society to
240. Pratt v. Daly, 55 Ariz. 535, 538, 104 P.2d 147, 148 (1940); Vesely v. Sager, 5 Cal. 3d 153,
158-59, 486 P.2d 151, 155, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623, 627 (1971).
241. See Nazareno v. Urie, 638 P.2d 671, 673 (Alaska 1981); Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 16
Cal. 3d 313, -,
546 P.2d 719, 726, 128 Cal. Rptr. 215, 222 (1976); Ono v. Applegate,
Hawaii ....
612 P.2d 533, 538 (1980).
242. Vesely, 5 Cal. 3d at 164, 486 P.2d at 159, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 631.
243. Nazareno v. Uric, 638 P.2d 671, 673 (Alaska 1981).
244. Id. at 674. The Nazareno court lists in a footnote the jurisdictions extending civil liability to
tavern owners and thejurisdictions refusing to abrogate the common law rule of nonliability. Id. n.3.
245. Culligan v. Cousar, 38 Il1. App. 2d 392,-,
187 N.E.2d 292, 301 (App. Ct. 1963) (citing
Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188,
-. , 156 A.2d 1,9 (1959)).
246. A common law negligence action includes the following elements: (1) a duty, recognized by
law, requiring the defendant to conform to a standard of conduct; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a
causal connection between the defendant's conduct and the resulting injuries; and (4) actual damage
or loss. See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 37, at 205-07 (4th ed. 1971).
247. 101 Idaho 617,619 P.2d 135 (1980).
248. Alegria v. Payonk, 101 Idaho 617,
-, 619 P.2d 135, 137 (1980). The Alegria court
overruled Meade v. Freeman, 93 Idaho 389, 462 P.2d 54 (1969), which held that the vending of
intoxicants was too remote to be considered a proximate cause ofinjuries or loss. 101 Idaho at __,
619 P.2d at 136-37. The Alegria court relied on the fact that the four cases, which provided the basis
for the Meade decision, had been overruled. Id.
249. 101 Idaho at__., 619 P.2d at 136.
250. Id.
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use reasonable care to avoid injury to the other person in any
situation in which it could be reasonably... foreseen that a failure
to use such care might result in such injury. ' 25 1 The court
abrogated the common law rule of nonliability by stating that it
could "perceive no justification for excluding the licensed vendor of
intoxicants from the . . . general duty which each person owes all
others in society. "252
Other courts have applied logic similar to the Alegria rationale
to abrogate common law nonliability. 25 3 A survey of case law
indicates that a majority of jurisdictions have extended common
254
law negligence liability to tavern owners.

B.

SOCIAL HOST LIABILITY UNDER COMMON LAW NEGLIGENCE
PRINCIPLES

Most jurisdictions extend liability under common law
negligence principles to tavern owners. 255 Courts and legislatures,
however, do not appear as eager to extend this liability to the social
host.256
The first case to extend negligence liability to a social host was
Wiener v. Gamma Phi Chapter of Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity.25 7 In
Wiener a college fraternity allowed large quantities of beer to be
served to a minor who, while driving home, was involved in an
automobile collision that injured the plaintiff.258 The plaintiff
brought an action against the fraternity sponsoring the party, the
ranch where the party took place, and an individual fraternity
member who arranged for the purchase of the alcohol. 259 The
plaintiff alleged that the fraternity made alcohol available to the
individual knowing that he was a minor, that he had driven an
automobile to the premises, and, that he would be driving it
251. Id. at -. , 619 P.2d at 137 (citing Kirby v. Sonville, 286 Or. 339, 594 P.2d 818 (1979)).
252. 101 Idaho at.-,
619 P.2d at 137.
253. See, e.g., Thaut v. Finley, 50 Mich. App. 611, 213 N.W.2d 820 (Ct. App. 1973); Trail v.
Christian, 298 Minn. 101, 213 N.W.2d 618 (1973).
254. See Nazareno, 638 P.2d at 674 n.3. The Nazareno court lists those jurisdictions extending
liability and the fifteenjurisdictions that do not extend liability. Id.
255. See id.
256. See Stein v. Beta Rho Alumni Assoc., Inc., 49 Or. 965, 621 P.2d 632 (1980) (refused to
extend liability to social host); Le Gault v. Klebba, 7 Mich. App. 640, 152 N.W.2d 712 (Ct. App.
1967) (extended liability to tavern owner, but not to social host).
257. 258 Or. 632, 485 P.2d 18 (1971).
258. Wiener v. Gamma Phi Chapter of Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, 258 Or. 632,
-, 485
P.2d 18, 20 (1971). The plaintiff was a passenger in the intoxicated minor's vehicle. He was injured
when the minor drove the automobile into a building. Id.
259. Id. The court found that no cause of action existed against the fraternity member and
slated that "we feel that liability [based on common law negligence principles] should not be
extended to one who acts only as a conduit in providing alcohol to those who directly serve it to
others." Id. at -,
485 P.2d at 22. The court dismissed the action against the ranch owners
because the failure to supervise is not negligence when no duty to supervise exists. Id.
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home. 260 The Oregon Supreme Court dismissed the actions against
the ranch owners and the individual fraternity member. 261 The
court recognized a cause of action against the fraternity under
ordinary negligence principles. 262 The court found that the
fraternity's status as a host was sufficient to raise a duty to refuse
alcohol to a guest when it was unreasonable under the
263
circumstances to allow him to drink.
The Wiener court, however, carefully limited its holding by
stating that each case must be decided upon its facts. 264 The court
noted that its holding was limited to those situations in which a
social host breaches his duty to refuse service to minors or to
individuals who are obviously intoxicated. 265 Moreover, in 1979
the Oregon Legislature further limited the court's holding in Wiener
by statutorily defining the specific situations that give rise to social
host liability. 266 In effect, the legislature preempted the court's
decision, which allowed the trial court to determine liability on a
267
case by case basis.
The California Supreme Court, in Coulter v. Superior Court,268
also addressed the issue of social host liability under common law
negligence principles. 269 The plaintiff brought an action against the
owners and the manager of an apartment complex for injuries
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at -,
at-,
at -,

485 P.2d at 23.
485 P.2d at 22.
485 P.2d at 23.

at-.,
485 P.2d at 21.
The court stated:

[A duty exists when the] host "has reason to know that he is dealing with persons
whose characteristics make it especially likely that they will do unreasonable things."
Such persons could include those already severely intoxicated, or those whose
behavior the host knows to be usually affected by alcohol. Also included might be
young people, if their ages were such that they could be expected, by virtue of their
youth alone or in connection with other circumstances, to behave in a dangerous
iashion under the influence ofalcohol.
Id. (quoting W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 175 (3d ed. 1964)).
266. OR. REv. STAT. §§30.955. .960 (1979). Section 30.955 provides that "[n]o private host is
liable for damages incurred or caused by an intoxicated social guest unless the private host has served
or provided alcoholic beverages to a social guest when such guest was visibly intoxicated." Id.
§ 30.955. Section 30.960 provides:
[Nbo social host shall be liable to third persons injured by or through persons not
having reached 21 years of age who obtained alcoholic beverages from the licensee,
permittee or social host unless it is demonstrated that a reasonable person would have
determined that identification should have been requested or that the identification
exhibited was altered or did not accurately describe the person to whom the alcoholic
liquor was sold or served.
Id. § 30.960.
267. See OR. REv. STAT. §§30.955. .960 (1979).
268.21 Cal. 3d 144. 577 P.2d 669. 145 Cal. Rptr. 534 (1978).
269. Coulter v. Superior Court. 21 Cal.3d 144. 577 11.2d 669. 145 Cal. Rptr. 534 (1978).
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received in an automobile collision. 270 The plaintiff alleged that the
defendants were negligent in serving excessive amounts of alcohol
to an individual, which resulted in his becoming inrtoxicated.

27 1

The

plaintiff alleged that this intoxication was the proximate cause of
the collision. 272 Although the court found that civil liability could be
imposed under a violation of California's Alcoholic Beverage
Control Act, it also addressed liability under common law
negligence principles.

273

The court noted that it long had been a principle of California
law that a person is liable for the foreseeable injuries caused by his
failure to exercise reasonable care. 274 The court found that this
concept most frequently was expressed in terms of the defendant
owing the plaintiff a duty to exercise reasonable care. 275 The court
indicated that this duty is dependent upon a number of relevant
factors. 276 The court stated that "foreseeability of the risk is a
primary consideration."

277

Therefore, the court reasoned that "the

service of alcoholic beverages to an obviously intoxicated person by
one who knows that such intoxicated person intends to drive a
motor vehicle creates a reasonablyforeseeable risk of injury to those on
the highway. "278 Thus, the Coulter court imposed liability upon a
279
social host under common law negligence principles.
In 1978 the California Legislature expressly abrogated the
holding

in Coulter.280

The California court

acknowledged the

281
constitutionality of this abrogation in Cory v. Shierloh.

270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 146, 577 P.2d at 671, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 536. The plaint ilalleged that the defendants
negligently served Janice Williams excessively large amounts of alcohol, that the delndants knew
she often drank to excess, that the defendants knew she would operate a motor vehicle, and that they
knew her conduct would expose third persons to a foreseeable risk of harm. Id.
273. Id. at 152, 577 P.2d at 673, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 538. The court found that § 25602 of the
California Business and Professions Code imposed civil liability on a noncommercial vendor who
provides alcoholic beverages to an intoxicated person. 21 Cal. 3d at 152, 577 P.2d at 673, 145 Cal.
Rptr. at 538. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25602 (West 1964) (amended West Supp. 1978).
274. 21 Cal. 3d at 152, 577 P.2d at 674, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 539 (citing Rowland v. Christian, 69
Cal. 2d 108, 433 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968)).
275. 21 Cal. 3d at 152, 577 P.2d at 674, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 539.
276. Id.
277. Id. (citing Weirum v. RKO General, Inc., 15 Cal. 3d 40, 46, 539 P.2d 36, 39, 123 Cal.
Rptr. 468, 471 (1975)).
278. 21 Cal. 3d at 152-53, 577 P.2d at 674, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 539. The court noted that one who
serves alcoholic beverages under these circumstances fails to exercise reasonable care. Id.
279. Id. at 155, 577 P.2d at 675-76, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 540-41.
280. CAL.. Bus. & PROF. Cot,. § 25602(c) (West Supp. 1982). Section 25602(c) provides:
The legislature hereby declares that this section shall be interpreted so that the
holding in . . . Coulter v. Superior Court . . . be abrogated in favor of prior judicial
interpretation finding the consumption of alcoholic beverages rather than the serving
of alcoholic beverages as the proximate cause of injuries inflicted upon another by an
intoxicated person.
Id. (citations omitted).
281. 29 Cal. 3d 430, 629 P.2d 8, 174 Cal. Rptr. 500 (1981).
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Undaunted by the amendments, a California Court of Appeals
used common law negligence principles to impose a limited form of
civil liability upon a social host in Cantor v. Anderson. 28 2 The plaintiff
283
in Cantor maintained a home for the developmentally disabled.
She was injured by one of the residents after he became intoxicated
at the home of neighbors. 284 The plaintiff brought an action against
the neighbors alleging that they negligently served alcoholic
28 5
beverages to the resident with full knowledge of his disability.
The Cantor court noted that the purpose of the 1978
amendments was to return California to the common law
nonliability rule of Cole v. Rush. 28 6 Cole held that the consumption of
alcohol was the proximate cause of the plaintiffs injuries. 2 7 The
return to the rule in Cole, the court reasoned, also meant a return to
the limitations of the rule. 288 The Cole court stated that no remedy
exists "for injury or death following the mere sale of liquor to the
ordinary man, either on the theory that it is a direct wrong or on the
ground that it is negligence, which imposes a legal liability on the
seller for damages resulting from the intoxication. ' 289 By strictly
applying this rule, the Cantor court concluded that the rule did not
affect liability for the furnishing of alcoholic beverages to a person
who voluntarily resists its consumption. 290 Thus, the court held
that a social host will not be shielded from liability by the 1978
amendments if he knows that his guest, because of some
exceptional physical or mental condition, should not be served
alcoholic beverages. 29 1 Furthermore, the amendments do not
protect a social host who is or should be aware of the risks involved
292
in providing such person with alcohol.
93
In Linn v. Rand a New Jersey court abrogated the common
law immunity of the social host. 294 The plaintiff alleged that the
282. 126 Cal. App. 3d 124, 178 Cal. Rptr. 540 (Ct. App. 1981).
283. Cantor v. Anderson, 126 Cal. App. 3d 124, 126, 178 Cal. Rptr. 540, 542 (Ct. App. 1981).
284. Id. Because of his alcohol consumption the resident experienced a seizure, lost consciousness, was rendered unable to control his actions, and subsequently became violent. Id. The
plaintiff attempted to render aid, but was injured when the resident grabbed her by the neck, threw
her down, and began striking her. Id. The plaintiff suffered injury to her body and nervous system.

Id.
285. Id. at.-,
286. Id. at -,

178 Cal. Rptr. at 540.
178 Cal. Rptr. at 544 (citing Cole v. Rush, 45 Cal. 2d 345, 289 P.2d 450

(1955)).
287. Cole v. Rush, 45 Cal. 2d at -, 289 P.2d at 452-53.
288. 126 Cal. App. 3d at 129, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 544.
289. 45 Cal. 2d at -, 289 P.2d at 452 (emphasis added).
290. 126 Cal. App. 3d at 130, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 544. The court noted that an example would be
"one who was in such a condition as to be deprived of his will power or responsibility for his
behavior. "Id. (citing 30 AM. JUR. 2D Intoxicating Liquors § 520, at 821).
291. 126 Cal. App. 3d at 132, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 546.
292. Id.
293. 140 N.J. Super. 212, 356 A.2d 15 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976).
294. Linn v. Rand, 140 N.J. Super. 212,_., 356 A.2d 15, 18 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976).
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defendant negligently allowed a minor to become intoxicated in his
home and then allowed her to operate a motor vehicle. 295 The court
stated that social host liability must be decided on a case by case
basis. 296 Under the facts presented, the court found that the
defendant would be liable for the intoxicated minor's negligent acts
if the plaintiff could prove that the defendant knew she was a
minor, that he knew she would operate a motor vehicle, that he
nevertheless served her the alcoholic beverages, and that the
intoxication was the proximate cause of the accident.297
A survey of case law indicates that although some courts
impose liability upon the social host under common law negligence
principles, they are in the minority. 298 The leading cases in the area
have been either overruled 2 99 or limited by the respective state
legislatures. 30 0 Most courts have held that no liability may be
imposed upon a social host under common law negligence
principles and that such an extension is only within the province of
the legislature. 30 1 These courts, however, often fail to take notice of
the devastating results of mixing drinking with driving. 30 2 One
commentator stated that situations will continue to arise in which
the social host could reasonably have prevented an accident and
resulting injuries by refusing to serve an intoxicated guest more
alcohol.303
A common law negligence action appears to be the most
appropriate basis of liability in these social host situations because
such an action would place the liability burden upon the person in
control. Obviously, an individual giving a drink to a minor or
serving alcohol to a visibly intoxicated person should know that he
is creating an unreasonable risk of harm to innocent third persons.
Logically, courts should hold the person in a position to prevent
this risk liable for his contribution to the creation of the risk.
295.
296.
297.
298.

Id. at.
356 A.2d at 16.
Id at
, 356 A.2d at 19.
Id. at
, 356 A.2d at 18.
Annot.. 97 A.I.R.3D 528, 566-72 (1980) (liability based on tort apart from violation of

liquor laws).
299. See Coulter v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 3d 144. 577 P.2d 669, 145 Cal. Rptr. 534 (1978)
(expressly overruled by the California Legislature's amendment of CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25602
(West Supp. 1982)).

300. See Wiener v. Gamma Phi Chapter of Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, 258 Or. 632, 485 P.2d
18 (1971) (limited to minors or visibly intoxicated guests by the enactment of OR. REv. STAT. 5
30.955, .960 (1979)).
301. See Cartwright v. Hyatt Corp., 460 F. Supp. 80 (D.D.C. 1978); Archer v. Bourne, 222 Ky.
268, 300 S.W. 604 (1927); Runge v. Watts, 180 Mont. 91, 589 P.2d 145 (1979); Schirmer v. Yost,
60 A.D.2d 789, 400 N.Y.S.2d 655 (App. Div. 1977); Tarwater v. Atlantic Co., 176 Tenn. 510, 144
S.W.2d 746 (1940); Halvorson v. Birchfield Boiler, Inc., 76 Wash. 2d 759, 458 P.2d 897 (1969).
302. See. e.g., Olsen v. Copeland, 90 Wis. 2d 483, 488, 280 N.W.2d 178, 180 (1979).
303. Comment, supra note 226, at 118.
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V. SOCIAL HOST LIABILITY IN NORTH DAKOTA
The North Dakota Supreme Court has not addressed whether
a social host may be held civilly liable for damages or injuries
caused by an intoxicated guest. Should this issue be presented,
however, the court will have several bases on which to impose
social host liability.
First, North Dakota has codified a dram shop act, 30 4 which
provides that "[e]very . . . person who shall be injured in person,
property or means of support by any intoxicated person, or in
consequence of intoxication, shall have a right of action against any
person who shall have caused intoxication by disposing, selling,
bartering, or giving away alcoholic beverages. ' 3 05 The North
Dakota Supreme Court, in Iszler v. Jorda,30 6 held that the dram shop
act "is remedial in character and should be construed to suppress
the mischief and advance the remedy.' '307 Furthermore, the
remedial character of the statute provides for its liberal
construction. 30 8 Accordingly, courts may construe the North
Dakota Dram Shop Act to provide a remedy against a social host
for injuries caused as a result of the intoxication of a guest.
Second, the North Dakota Legislature has enacted an
alcoholic beverage control act.30 9 The statute provides a criminal
penalty for" [a]ny person delivering alcoholic beverages to a person
under twenty-one years of age, an habitual drunkard, an
incompetent, or an intoxicated person. "310 Although this statute is
penal in nature, an argument exists that civil liability should be
extended under negligence principles. The North Dakota Supreme
Court has held a violation of a statute to be evidence of
negligence. 3 11 Thus, if a plaintiff proved that the social host
violated a statutory duty not to serve alcohol to specified
individuals, courts could extend civil liability under the penal
alcoholic beverage control act to the social host.
Finally, courts could extend liability to social hosts in North
304. See N.D. CENT. CODE S 5-01-06 (1975).
305. Id. The North Dakota Century Code defines "person" to include "a human being." Id. 5
1-01-28.
306.80 N.W.2d 665 (N.D.1957).
307. Iszler v.Jorda, 80 N.W.2d 665, 667 (N.D. 1957).
308. A statute that is penal in character, as opposed to remedial, should be strictly construed.
Miller v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 48 Ill. App. 2d 412, _,
199 N.E.2d 300, 305 (App. Ct. 1964).
See N.D. CENT. CODE § 1-02-01 (1975). Section 1-02-01 provides that all statutes shall be liberally
construed. Id.
309. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 5-01-09 (1975).
310. Id.
311. Anderson v. Miller's Fairway Foods, 225 N.W.2d 579, 583 (N.D. 1975) (citing Steuber v.
Hastings Heating & Sheet Metal Co., 153 N.W.2d 804 (N.D. 1967)).
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Dakota under common law negligence principles. This theory
requires proof that the social host had a duty not to serve alcoholic
beverages to an individual in a situation in which it was reasonably
foreseeable that, because of intoxication, the individual would
create a risk of harm to himself or others. 3 12 A breach of the duty
would exist if the plaintiff proved that the host failed to exercise
reasonable care by allowing an intoxicated guest to consume more
alcohol or to operate a motor vehicle. 31 3 The plaintiff could prove
causation by showing that, but for the intoxication, the accident
would not have occurred.3 14 Thus, by showing the elements of a
typical negligence action, a plaintiff could reasonably argue that
civil liability should be extended to the social host.
VI. CONCLUSION
To help protect innocent third parties from drunken drivers,
courts should extend civil liability to individuals who contribute to
the driver's intoxication. It is not unreasonable to impose liability
on anyone, including the social host, who promotes the obvious
intoxication of a guest under conditions involving a foreseeable risk
of harm to others. As one California court stated, "The danger of
ultimate harm is equally foreseeable to the reasonably perceptive
host as to the bartender. The danger and risk to the potential victim
' 315
on the highway is equally as great, regardless of the source.
Undoubtedly, the imposition of civil liability may reduce the
conviviality of a social host, but this must be balanced with the
"serious hazard to the lives, limbs, and property of the public at
large, and the great potential for human suffering which attends the
3
presence on the highways of intoxicated drivers." 16
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312. See Coulter v. Superior Court. 21 Cal. 3d 144. 149-50. 577 P.2d 669, 671-72. 145 Cal.
Rptr. 534. 536-37 (1978): Wienerv. Gamma Phi Chapter of Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity. 258 Or.
632.
. 485 P.2d 18. 24 (197 1).
313. Comment. supra note 226. at 116.
314. Comment. supra note 226. at 116.
315. Coulter. 21 Cal. 3d at 153. 577 P.2d at 674. 145 Cal. Rptr. at 539.
316. Id. at 154. 577 P.2d at 675. 145 Cal. Rptr. at 540.

